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INTRODUCTION 
Modern organizations increasingly rely on heterogeneous groups to negotiate 
important decisions. Inside organizations, traditional hierarchical arrangements are 
replaced by lateral structures such as task forces and project teams (Ford & Randolph, 
1992). Between organizations, arm-length competitive relationships are increasingly 
transformed into long term partnering arrangements that are managed through 
integrated teams (Rognes, 1995). When organizations channel decisions into 
heterogeneous teams, they create mixed motive situations that group members are 
inclined to approach with different goal orientations (Brett, 1991). Some members 
may adopt an individualistic orientation, while other members may have a more 
cooperative orientation. This mixture of orientations is most likely critical for the 
groups’ ability to reach high quality agreements (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).  
However, despite its practical importance, our knowledge about goal 
orientations in negotiations is limited in several ways. First, previous research has 
primarily examined dyadic negotiations (two parties) rather than group negotiations 
(three or more parties). Second, research has examined situations where all members 
have had the same orientation, and not included mixed orientation compositions (e.g., 
individualists meeting cooperators). Third, focus has been on objective effectiveness 
criteria at the group level (i.e., joint gain), while subjective and individual level 
criteria largely have been ignored. Finally, some studies have methodological features 
that make the results questionable as how they relate to goal orientations (e.g., 
confounding effects, manipulation checks).  
Given its practical relevance and lack of scholarly work, the purpose of this 
dissertation was to address the identified gaps in the literature, and examine how the 
mixture of goal orientations in negotiating groups impacts several effectiveness 
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criteria. I investigated this question through three separate studies that built on each 
other. Study 1 examined goal orientation effects in triads. In order to further 
understand the results in the first study, study 2 examined goal orientation effects in 
dyads. Finally, based on the results in the first two studies, study 3 examined goal 
orientation effects in triads where members had information about each other’s 
orientation. Next, I introduce the theoretical and methodological framework, display 
the main results, and briefly discuss some of the findings.  
 
THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
 A negotiator's goal orientation is defined in terms of preferences towards own 
and other's outcomes. I studied two orientations that seems widespread in negotiation 
situations; individualistic (goal of maximizing own outcome) and cooperative (goal of 
maximizing joint outcome as well as own). A specific orientation may have its origin 
in individual dispositions (trait) and/or situational characteristics (state). I focused on 
outcome preferences induced by instructions (Deutsch, 1973), as this may be 
particularly interesting from a managerial point of view. 
 In negotiation theory, aspiration-level models (e.g., Siegel & Fouraker, 1960), 
cooperation-competition models (e.g., Deutsch, 1973), and dual concern models (e.g., 
Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) may help explain how orientation impacts negotiation behavior 
and outcome. However, aspiration-level models leave out the cooperative orientation, 
and cooperation-competition models treat orientation as one-dimensional. Dual 
concern models overcome these limitations, but do not accurately predict the 
negotiation process between parties with different orientations. Thus, I also examined 
additional lines of literature. The experimental gaming literature yielded insight into 
models such as behavioral assimilation (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a; 1970b), 
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while group composition literature proved useful in order to understand heterogeneity 
(e.g., Jackson, 1992) and social influence (e.g., Peterson & Nemeth, 1996). 
 I found three types of empirical negotiation studies especially relevant for my 
research question; (1) studies that manipulate orientation through direct instructions 
(e.g., Weingart, Bennett & Brett, 1993; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Lewis & Fry, 1977; 
Schultz & Pruitt, 1978; Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; O'Connor, 1997), (2) studies that 
manipulate variables presumed to affect orientation (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a; 
1984b; Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Weingart, Hyder & Prietula, 1986; De Dreu, Giebels 
& Van de Vliert, 1998), and (3) studies that measure orientation as an individual 
disposition (e.g., De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Olekalns, Smith & Kibby, 1996; 
Shapiro & Rognes, 1996). The general finding from these studies are that cooperative 
compositions reach higher joint outcome than individualistic compositions. 
 However, previous research have largely ignored negotiating triads, mixed 
orientation compositions, and subjective and individual level effectiveness criteria. 
Furthermore, some earlier studies have methodological features that are noteworthy. 
For example, some studies uses instructions that are more like a behavioral instruction 
than a goal orientation, or they do not separate between manipulation of orientation 
and information about the other party's orientation (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-
Goldband & Carnevale, 1980). Moreover, some studies do not have a manipulation 
check, or the manipulation check do not refer precisely to goal orientation. It is 
therefore unclear if these studies really examines orientation.  
In summary, the discussion above underscore the need for further research on 
goal orientation in negotiation. Based on negotiation research and relevant additional 
literature, I developed several studies intended to advance our knowledge in this field. 
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METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Design and Tasks 
I used an experimental research design because the research question was 
causal, because the purpose was to test theory, and because this design contributed to 
cumulative research. The experimental design allowed me to compare between 
different group compositions (all members cooperative, all members individualistic, 
and mixed), and between negotiators with different orientations (cooperative and 
individualistic). The experimental task in study 1 and 3 consisted of a three-person 
negotiation exercise developed for these studies. The participants negotiated about a 
business partnership, and the task consisted of five issues, each with four or five 
alternatives. The experimental task in study 2 was a dyadic negotiation simulation 
based on negotiation tasks used in previous research (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Both 
tasks allowed for joint gain through logrolling. 
 
Subjects and Procedures 
 A total of 618 undergraduate business students participated in the three studies 
(231, 156, and 231, respectively). Their mean age was 22 years, and about 30 % were 
females. I conducted the experiments during class meetings in courses in 
organizational behavior. The participants were randomly assigned goal orientation and 
roles. When finishing the preparation, after about 15 minutes, the groups had a total 
time of 45 minutes to negotiate (30 minutes for the dyads in study 2). Immediately 
following the negotiations, the participants answered a post-negotiation questionnaire 
containing background information, manipulation checks, and questions about 
individual behavior and group process. Finally, I debriefed the subjects. 
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Manipulations and Measures 
I manipulated the subjects goal orientation (individualistic or cooperative) 
through written instructions (Weingart et al., 1993; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). In the 
individualistic condition, the subjects read that their primary goal was to maximize 
own outcome. In the cooperative condition the participants read that their primary 
goal was to maximize own and the total outcome for the group. In study 3, the 
instruction about own goal orientation was followed by information about which goal 
orientation the subject could expect from each of the other group members. 
 I measured four dependent variables; individual result, group result, 
satisfaction and perceived fairness. Individual result was measured as the total 
point/profit achieved by the negotiator across the issues. Group result was measured 
as Pareto efficiency. I developed an index based on Tripp & Sondak (1992) where I 
measured the number of possible agreements that were Pareto superior to the solution 
chosen by each group. The variable was transformed (due to skewness), standardized 
and reversed. Satisfaction and perceived fairness were measured with questions 
related to process and result. In addition to the four dependent variables, I also 
collected process data through the questionnaire and tape recorders. 
 
Data validation and Analyses 
 I checked the manipulation instruction by asking the subjects in the post 
negotiation questionnaire to indicate their primary objective in the negotiation 
(Weingart et al., 1993). Chi-square analysis showed that the manipulation had been 
successful. However, some participants did not perceive their goal orientation as 
intended, and in order to enhance the precision, I included in my primary analyses 
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only those compositions where all negotiators showed correspondence between the 
instruction and the check. 
I also checked the dependent variables to secure valid analyses. High negative 
intraclass correlations (Kenny & LaVoie, 1985) showed that individual results were 
not independent of each other within groups. I thus used difference analysis with one-
sample t-tests when members within groups were compared. Intraclass correlations for 
perceived fairness were positive and high, and made individual level analyses 
questionable (Hoyle & Crawford, 1994). Fairness was therefore validated at the group 
level by demonstrating within-group interrater agreement (James, Demaree & Wolf, 
1984; 1993). 
 
MAIN RESULTS 
Study 1 
 This study examined the relationship between the mixture of goal orientation 
and effectiveness in triads. At the group level, I found that group composition did not 
affect group result (F = .35, p = .79), but did affect perceived fairness (F = 4.25, p < 
.01). Groups with only cooperative members perceived significant higher fairness than 
each of the other compositions. At the individual level, there were no significant 
differences in satisfaction. However, individualistic members achieved higher 
individual results than their cooperative opponents did (t = 2.68, p < .05), both when 
they were in majority and minority in the triad. Individual results in all experimental 
conditions are shown in figure 1. Individual results are consistently reduced when the 
number of individualistic opponents increases, but this pattern is not statistically 
significant.   
---------- Figure 1 about here ---------- 
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Study 2 
The second study examined the relationship between the mixture of goal 
orientation and effectiveness in dyads. I found that composition had an impact on both 
group result (F = 5.46, p < .01), and perceived fairness (F = 2.61, p < .10). Two 
individualists negotiating with each other reached both significant lower group results 
and lower perceived fairness than cooperative and mixed compositions. Turning to the 
individual level, goal orientation had no effect on satisfaction. However, goal 
orientation affected individual results. Individualists again outperformed their 
cooperative opponents (F = 4.23, p < .05), and individual results in the four 
experimental conditions are illustrated in figure 2. The pattern is consistent with study 
1; negotiators reach higher individual results when they negotiate against a 
cooperative opponent than against an individualistic opponent (individualists; F = 
2.36, p < .01, cooperators; F = 2.36, p = .13). 
---------- Figure 2 about here ---------- 
 
Study 3 
The third study examined the relationship between the mixture of goal 
orientation and effectiveness in triads, when group members had information about 
each other’s orientation. Group composition impacted group result (F = 5.70, p < .01). 
Groups with only individualistic members did significant better than each of the other 
group compositions. I found no significant differences in perceived fairness across 
compositions (F = 1.59, p = 0.20). At the individual level, cooperators were more 
satisfied when they negotiated with other cooperators rather than with individualists 
(F = 3.93, p < .05). When individualists where in majority in the triad, they reached 
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higher individual results than their cooperative opponent (t = 2.24, p < .05). Individual 
results are displayed in figure 3. Cooperative members have a marginally significant 
drop in individual results when the number of individualistic opponents increases (F = 
2.45, p < .10). 
---------- Figure 3 about here ---------- 
 
Group process data from the questionnaires yielded interesting patterns. 
Looking at integrative elements (information exchange, trust), individualistic groups 
were less integrative than other groups in the start phase (F = 4.42, p < .05), but more 
integrative than others in the final phase (F = 5.28, p < .05). The individualistic groups 
had an escalating integrative dynamic (F = 8.30, p < .001) which come clear in figure 
4. Looking at distributive elements (conflict, argumentation), I found that 
individualistic groups were slightly more distributive than other groups in the start 
phase (F = 2.67, p = .11), and less distributive in the last phase (F = 4.81, p < .05). 
The findings are displayed in figure 5. Furthermore, regression analyses showed that 
the process in the final phase was most important for group result (integrative 
positive, distributive negative).  
---------- Figure 4 and 5 about here ---------- 
 
BRIEF DISCUSSION 
 The main contributions of this dissertation are precise examinations of how 
mixture of goal orientations impacts several effectiveness criteria in negotiating 
groups. Below, I focus on some questions that may be examined in future research in 
order to understand the relationship between goal orientation and the creation of 
value. 
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 Both cooperative compositions and mix oriented compositions reached 
medium Pareto efficiency in all three studies. This indicate that the number of 
cooperative negotiators are insignificant for joint gain, as long as at least one of the 
negotiators have this orientation. The results in the individualistic compositions varied 
across conditions. In dyads, individualistic compositions reached very low joint gain. 
In groups, individualistic compositions reached medium joint gain, while in groups 
where the members knew each other's orientation, individualistic groups achieved 
nearly Pareto optimal agreements. 
A first interesting question is why an individualistic composition was found to 
be, relative to other compositions, better in groups than in dyads. One speculation can 
be that in groups, there is always a person that can take the role as a mediator when 
conflicts between two group members threatens to escalate (Shapiro & Rognes, 1996). 
This is not the case in dyads, and consequently, conflicts may escalate. Future research 
should also consider other possible explanations, such as different norms in dyads and 
groups, and if people with the same orientation chose different behavior in dyads and 
groups. 
 A second timely question is why cooperative compositions didn't do better. 
One possible explanation may be that the parties are so focused on cooperation that 
they satisfice (Simon, 1957), and thus choose the first acceptable agreement. This may 
especially be the case when members know each other's cooperative orientation. 
Creation of values in negotiation may, however, require energetic members that 
participate in intense search for integrative agreements.  
A third question is why the individualistic groups did so well when they knew 
each other's orientation. I suggest that members of individualistic groups developed an 
enlightened self-interest (Rubin, 1991). Throughout the negotiation, the members 
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recognized that none of them would yield easily, and realized that the best way to 
achieve their individual goals was through an integrative process, and not through 
pressure tactics. This may have created the integrative escalation and distributive de-
escalation found in the process analyses, and driven the groups towards Pareto-
optimal agreements.  
A fourth moment for future studies is that individualistic compositions seems 
very context sensitive. While cooperative compositions generally are relatively robust 
across situations, individualistic compositions are not (e.g., Weingart et al., 1993;  
Carnevale & Isen, 1986;  Lewis & Fry, 1977). Hence, cooperative compositions are 
safe, as they usually reach respectable joint outcomes. Individualistic compositions are 
more risky, though, as they often reach poor joint outcomes. However, as shown in 
this dissertation, individualistic compositions may under some conditions (here: group 
and knowledge of other's orientation) reach especially high quality agreements. In 
fact, individualistic compositions seem to have a greater potential than other 
compositions. Future research should examine under which conditions this potential is 
released.  
 In conclusion, the common understanding of individualistic orientations as 
detrimental for group outcome has to be reconsidered.  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Individual result as a function of own orientation and group composition in 
study 1 
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CCC = three cooperative members, CCI = two cooperative members and one 
individualistic member, CII = one cooperative member and two individualistic 
members, and III = three individualistic members. 
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Figure 2: Individual result as a function of own orientation and dyad composition in 
study 2 
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CC = two cooperative members, CI = one cooperative member and one individualistic 
member, and II = two individualistic members. 
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Figure 3: Individual result as a function of own orientation and group composition in 
study 3 
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CCC = three cooperative members, CCI = two cooperative members and one 
individualistic member, CII = one cooperative member and two individualistic 
members, and III = three individualistic members. 
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Figure 4: Effect of group composition on integrative process in study 3 
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III-groups = groups with three individualistic members. Other groups = groups with 
one or more cooperative oriented members (CCC-, CCI- and CII-groups). 
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Figure 5: Effect of group composition on distributive process in study 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III-groups = groups with three individualistic members. Other groups = groups with 
one or more cooperative oriented members (CCC-, CCI- and CII-groups). 
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